Censoring Science

More than a month ago, I wrote about the implications of a case involving biosecurity on the scientific process, publishing, and the relationship between academic research and government -- a story which has resurfaced across national and international headlines this week as:

"For the first time ever, a government advisory board is asking scientific journals not to publish details of certain biomedical experiments, for fear that the information could be used by terrorists to create deadly viruses and touch off epidemics." (Source: New York Times.)

The story is receiving particular attention in Wisconsin, where research similar in nature to the Dutch study was performed by a professor at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.  The national security/bioterrorism issues posed by the work is described in an article from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel which ran last week:

"Kawaoka has created a contagion virus in his lab, a UW official confirmed. But the official said he couldn't discuss the nature of the virus because it would compromise the publication of Kawaoka's research.

A Science magazine report detailing the work done by Dutch scientist Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands reported that Fouchier had developed a man-made H5N1 avian influenza strain that had been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets. Fouchier reported that studies show that any influenza strain passed among ferrets has also been transmissible among humans and vice versa.

The Science report, which focused on Fouchier's studies, said Kawaoka's research came up with comparable results.

"The research by the Kawaoka and Fouchier teams set out to answer a question that has long puzzled scientists. Does H5N1, which rarely causes human disease, have the potential to trigger a pandemic?" the magazine reported."

The New York Times piece provides additional detail into the nature of the scientific problem -- Avian flu in its present form is rarely contagious, but the introduction of relatively few mutations to the viral genome can change that reality dramatically:

"The virus, A(H5N1), causes bird flu, which rarely infects people but has an extraordinarily high death rate when it does. Since the virus was first detected in 1997, about 600 people have contracted it, and more than half have died. Nearly all have caught it from birds, and most cases have been in Asia. Scientists have watched the virus, worrying that if it developed the ability to spread easily from person to person, it could create one of the deadliest pandemics ever. 

A government advisory panel, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, overseen by the National Institutes of Health, has asked two journals, Science and Nature, to keep certain details out of reports that they intend to publish on the research. The panel said conclusions should be published, but not “experimental details and mutation data that would enable replication of the experiments.” 

Certainly, the implications of this research for national security and global health are obvious.  However, I was pleased to learn that steps are being taken to address the problematic nature of censoring biomedical research -- many of the issues I raised when I first wrote about this story.  Reports another Journal-Sentinel article:

"Paul Biedrzycki, director of disease control and environmental health for the Milwaukee Health Department, said rapid advancements in biotechnology and gene sequencing in recent years have raised important new questions about national health security and biohazards.

"Making bugs is becoming less expensive and more accessible," he said. "Research and science have really taken off, and it's available on the Internet. What used to require a PhD in microbiology can now be done with a bachelor's and some science knowledge."

The NIH said the federal government was working to establish a way to allow secure access to the information "to those with a legitimate need in order to achieve important public health goals." In addition, the government also is developing a policy that would augment current approaches to evaluating research that can potentially be misused."

It will be interesting to see what form such security measures take, and how methodologically vague the Science/Nature papers on the work end up being when they are finally released.